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This essay discusses progress and directionality, both in nature, 
in science and in society, treating as its starting-point the 
reflections, parallelisms and comparisons of Ruse’s essay, ‘A 
Threefold Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development 
in Society, Science and the Organic World’, but reaching 
substantially different conclusions. The essay thus ranges over 
progress and directionality in the world of natural evolution, in 
the sciences and the humanities, and in history and society. It 
defends non-relative progress in science and the humanities, 
criticising here both the approach to these disciplines of the 
strongly evolutionary epistemology of Hull and the more 
moderate evolutionary epistemology of Ruse. It further defends 
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the possibility of progress and directionality in history and 
society, and also, following Rolston, in the course of evolution 
within the world of nature, where the kind of directionality to be 
found has multiple directions rather than being unilinear. 
Subsequently it relates conclusions about these fields to 
theological reflections (characteristic of Judaism, Christianity 




In this essay I discuss progress and directionality, both in nature, 
in science and in society. Much the same enterprise was 
pioneered by Michael Ruse, in his essay ‘A Threefold 
Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development in Society, 
Science and the Organic World’ (1). Such parallelisms and 
comparisons will also be considered in this essay, but with 
different conclusions. This essay accordingly ranges over 
progress and directionality in the world of nature, in the sciences 
and the humanities, and in history and society. Subsequently I 
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relate conclusions about science, society and nature to 
theological reflections concerning a creative and value-loving 
intelligence; this section will address the emergence of value 
and its gradual but belated appearance both in nature and in 
culture. 
 
Before more is said, a few words are in place to clarify the 
notions of progress and of directionality. Progress, as Ruse 
remarks, involves change (many would say ‘a process of 
change’) that has (or, we might add by way of qualification, 
usually has) a linear character. (Change that doubles back on 
itself or repeats itself, as Ruse at once comments, can hardly 
count as progress.) In addition, it involves improvement, on one 
criterion or another. If subsequent stages are not under some 
description better than the ones that preceded them, then neither 
they nor the process that produced them amount to progress. (2) 
However, the criteria of progress diverge. While scientific 
progress is often regarded (at least by realists) as involving a 
greater approximation to the truth, social progress is liable to 
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betoken either enhanced welfare, or greater freedom, or moves 
towards justice or towards equality. In what follows, appropriate 
criteria will be specified as and when they become relevant. 
 
Directionality is both broader and narrower than progress. It too 
involves change, and change that is either directed towards an 
agreed direction or destination or that moves undirected in one 
direction or another. Although not all directionality is 
progressive, often it is such, involving improvement, at least 
from the perspective of those who welcome the direction or 
directions in question. Directionality, however, need not involve 
change taking place in a single direction, but can involve change 
in multiple directions, sometimes simultaneously. As we shall 
see, a possible model of the history of life on earth is one 
involving multiple directionality. (Some might say the same, in 
an adjusted sense, about human culture.) 
 
2. HISTORY AND LAWS OF PROGRESS 
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The once prevalent belief in progress towards human happiness 
understood as pervading the entire course of human history has 
widely been discarded. From the Enlightenment into the early 
twentieth century, this belief was held so strongly that 
philosophers such as Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, Hegel, 
Marx and Spencer competed to articulate actual laws of 
progress, manifested in history and governing its evolution. By 
‘progress’ was meant change involving improvement, whether 
the improvement was intellectual, social or political, or all of 
these together. The story of the different versions of this belief 
can readily be found in works such as J.B. Bury’s The Idea of 
Progress, John Baillie’s The Belief in Progress, and Robert 
Nisbet’s History of the Idea of Progress (3). Given such laws, 
the patterns and the unfolding of history would have had a 
character of inevitability. 
 
But two World Wars largely shattered this belief, particularly 
with regard to social and political progress, but to some extent 
with regard to progress in general. Not only was doubt cast on 
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laws of history, but often also on actual belief in progress, or at 
least on progress having favourable prospects. As the various 
metaphysical underpinnings of progress ceased to be credited, 
so did people’s remaining reliance on progress itself. 
 
With regard to laws of history, a significant impact on their 
tenability was generated by an argument of Karl Popper in The 
Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper concluded that there are 
no laws of history, because whatever predictions may be made 
about people’s behaviour, human beings have the capacity to 
falsify them by choosing to respond or act differently, and not as 
predicted. By contrast, the belief that history unfolds in 
accordance with laws of history deprives us of our responsibility 
(4). Since history is in large measure the outcome of people’s 
choices, it cannot be regarded as governed by laws that are 
supposed to have effect regardless of such choices. 
 
Popper should not be regarded, however, as a critic of all belief 
in progress. What he objected to was historicism, or large-scale 
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attempts to predict the human future, to which he further 
objected that human action is considerably affected by human 
knowledge, and that the future of human knowledge is itself 
unpredictable (5). Yet he maintained that in some 
circumstances, scientific progress is assured and will be made 
(6), and also discusses its prospects and possible obstacles (7); 
and in other writings he took pains to rehabilitate the reputation 
of Xenophanes, the earliest Western defender of belief in 
progress on the part of humanity with regard to its 
understanding of the physical world (see below) (8). 
Furthermore in Conjectures and Refutations he spells out the 
distinction between belief in historical laws of progress, which 
he rejects, and his own belief that continued growth is 
characteristic of and essential to scientific knowledge, despite 
the dangers that it may be blocked or retarded (9). 
 
Nevertheless the kind of belief that represents progress as law-
governed and inevitable was now widely discarded, even where 
belief in progress itself survived. An example of this trend can 
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already be found in the view of the early-twentieth-century 
historian Herbert Butterfield, who, in The Whig Interpretation of 
History (1931), contended that historians should eschew 
interpretations and interpretative frameworks altogether (10), 
and therewith any tendency to appeal to would-be historical 
laws. Yet at the same time Butterfield retained belief in the 
operation of providence within history, producing progressive 
outcomes sometimes in conflict with the intentions of the 
relevant agents (11). Butterfield’s own consistency in rejecting 
interpretation in history and at the same time continuing to 
discern the workings of providence can be questioned (12); but 
his overall stance manifests the possibility of rejecting laws of 
history without completely abandoning belief either in progress 
or in directionality at the same time. 
 
Belief in the kind of progress that is guaranteed by historical 
laws was more widely discarded still with the widespread 
demise of the influence of Marxism in 1989. Paradoxically we 
might well, in the light of Popper’s arguments, regard the related 
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abandonment of belief in the inevitability of progress as 
progress itself, whether progress in history, the philosophy of 
history or in metaphysics. But the issue of whether progress 
either in science or in humanities such as history is possible is 
debated, and will shortly be considered, after consideration has 
first been given to the relation of Darwinian evolution to 
progress. 
 
3. EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS 
The increasing adoption across the early part of the twentieth 
century of the Darwinian synthesis (13) eventually fostered a 
corresponding belief about the absence of progress in the 
evolution of species by natural selection. If what survives is 
what is fittest to survive, whether through out-predating or out-
breeding competitors or by occupying a distinctive, survival-
friendly niche, then surviving species need be no more 
intelligent than the ones they outlive, and in some cases will be 
parasites that survive through dependency and at the same time 
through predation on species with greater consciousness and 
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understanding. The adoption of this synthesis did not lead at 
once to a discarding of belief in progress, for, as Michael Ruse 
relates, ‘[t]he great mathematicians who synthesized Darwinian 
selection with Mendelian genetics – R.A. Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane 
and Sewall Wright – were all ardent progressionists’ who ‘saw 
no incompatibility between their evolutionism and 
progressionism’ (14). But, as Ruse proceeds to recount, the next 
generation of evolutionists, ‘[m]en like Theodosius Dobzhansky 
and George Simpson and Ernst Mayr and G. Ledyard Stebbings 
… set out deliberately to cleanse their work of progressionist 
language and descriptions and mechanisms and conclusions’ 
(15), seeing this as a requirement of a professional, value-free 
approach. 
 
The waning of belief in law-governed progress permeating 
human history may have had an impact on attitudes to nature, in 
particular producing a reduced willingness to discern progress 
across the course of evolution. The problem here was not the 
inapplicability of laws of nature, but a lack of confidence in the 
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passage of time displaying any progressive tendencies at all. If 
there is little or no sign of purposiveness in human history, and 
the consciousness of such purposiveness underwent a decline, 
then the inclination to detect directionality or progress within 
the processes of the natural world could well have been 
correspondingly reduced at the same time. As has been 
mentioned, Michael Ruse has discussed in one of his essays 
some possible parallelisms between the development of society, 
the development of science, and the (evolutionary) development 
of organisms (16). In this essay I will refer to his treatment of 
this triple theme, but will be investigating not so much parallels 
as different grounds and different criteria for recognising both 
directionality and progress. 
 
In any case it has become a commonplace among philosophers 
of science (and philosophers of biology in particular) that there 
is no discernible purpose in the world of nature, and no 
discernible directionality either. Since evolution proceeds 
through natural selection, with its focus on survival, there is no 
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requirement for the survivors (whether species or individuals) to 
be superior, let alone nobler, than their predecessors, for 
survival can be due to factors other than intelligence, versatility, 
initiative or character. Natural selection depends mainly on 
adaptation, and adaptation takes many forms, far from all of 
which are in any way progressive, or so it is widely held. 
 
Some theorists, however, have taken the view that this 
conclusion went too far. Holmes Rolston, for example, wanted 
to keep room for the ‘step up, lock up’ aspect of evolution, 
whereby evolutionary achievements such as sight or creativity, 
once achieved, are somehow preserved rather than eliminated, 
and sought to supplement Darwinian explanations so as to 
accommodate it. However ‘groping, blind and unmerciful’ the 
system of nature ‘may otherwise seem’, … ‘out of seeming 
disorder, order comes the more. There flows this great river of 
life, strange and valuable because it flows … uphill, 
negentropically from nonbeing to being, from nonlife to 
objective life and on to subjective life’. (17). This stance did not 
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require an abandonment of Darwinism (certainly not in 
Rolston’s own self-understanding or, we might add, at all), but 
suggested that Darwinism, with its characteristic implicit 
abandonment of directionality, was not the whole story. 
 
Other philosophers, however, have applied the view that there is 
no directionality or progress in nature to the sphere of science 
itself, on the ground that science is nothing but an outgrowth of 
evolutionary processes. This latter account of science can be 
found in Stephen Toulmin’s article ‘The Evolutionary 
Development of Science’ and his subsequent book Human 
Understanding (18). In the earlier essay Toulmin wrote: 
 
Science develops … as the outcome of a double process: at 
each stage, a pool of competing intellectual variants is in 
circulation, and in each generation a selection process is going 
on, by which certain of these variants are accepted and 
incorporated into the science concerned, to be passed on to the 
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next generation of workers as integral elements of the 
tradition. (19) 
 
Thus selection within science is compared to selection within 
nature; and a few pages later Toulmin affirms that he intends 
this comparison to be taken seriously, and not just as a figure of 
speech (20). While it was not obligatory to accept that what 
holds good in the realm of natural selection holds good also in 
the realm of the kind of purposive selection that characterises 
human undertakings such as natural science, it now became 
possible to hold that what survives and succeeds in science is 
what captures attention in relevant universities, schools and 
journals, and that this need not be the most incisive or the most 
penetrating work, as opposed to being the fittest to win 
followers and secure influence and thus survive. Nor was 
Toulmin a lone voice; for Popper himself endorsed evolutionary 
epistemology in his 1972 book Objective Knowledge (21). In the 
coming section, this approach to human intellectual 
undertakings such as the sciences is taken further. After that, I 
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will be returning to issues of directionality and progress in 
evolution and thus in nature. 
 
4. THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES 
Cultural developments thus came to be seen as a function of a 
kind of natural selection which selects between hypotheses or 
even between paradigms. Despite the obvious differences 
between science and natural evolution, such as the intentionality 
of changes in science and the apparent absence of intentionality 
in nature, philosophers of science such as David Hull have 
contended that the common element of selection was the crucial 
one, and that the process by which science develops consists in 
competition between scientific schools or groupings, as well as 
competition within such schools, and also in reputational 
success for scientists who lobby and network most effectively in 
the promotion of their hypotheses and interpretations. 
According to Hull, ‘scientists behave in ways calculated to get 
their views accepted as their view by other scientists’ (22), and 
‘The factionalism that scientists themselves so often decry 
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facilitates rather than frustrates progress in science’ (23). Thus it 
is its fitness to survive within scientific society that qualifies 
scientific work for scientific acceptance, rather than (say) its 
rationality. And implicitly there is little or no reason to regard 
the current state of science as better than previous stages, or to 
regard science as embodying either directionality or progress. 
 
But this understanding of science has been potentially 
problematic for philosophers of science themselves, as they 
have had to regard their own work (if the evolutionary story is 
accepted) as lacking any kind of superior rationality, and as 
successful, if it was successful, on the basis of its persuasiveness 
and consequent popularity, rather than of its superior intellectual 
content and merits. Successful hypotheses, strictly speaking, 
were not bound to explain the phenomena better, or to explain a 
wider range of phenomena than rival hypotheses, for they were 
successful on the strength of their fitness to survive, which was 
not invariably the same thing. 
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But if theories are sometimes accepted or rejected for good 
reasons, through the exercise of rational choice and 
discrimination, then there remains scope for belief in progress 
(involving enhanced understanding of reality), at least within the 
sciences. Take Darwinism itself; arguably it was accepted 
because it explained the phenomena of the species and 
speciation better than rival theories, and was in due course 
vindicated as the phenomena that it predicted were seen to 
occur, and when, in conjunction with Mendelian genetics, it 
proved capable of explaining inheritance as well. But to accept 
this is to regard Darwinism as an improvement on previous 
theories. An important aspect here is the way in which human 
beings are capable of discriminating between better and worse 
explanations, and forming beliefs for reasons. To the extent that 
this process informed the widespread acceptance of Darwinism, 





To return, however, to Hull’s evolutionary account of science, it 
is worth noting here his proposed definition of ‘selection’: ‘a 
process in which the differential extinction and proliferation of 
interactors cause [his italics] the differential perpetuation of the 
replicators that produced them’ (24). This definition is intended 
to apply to selection not only in organic evolutionary contexts, 
but to conceptual selection in science as well; this is attested by 
Hull’s claim of a few pages later: ‘My concepts have the added 
virtue that they are sufficiently general to apply to conceptual 
evolution as well, in particular to conceptual selection in 
science.’ (25) (Thus the scope of this account of selection 
includes disciplines such as history and literary criticism as well 
as the empirical sciences.) Hull recognises that some selection is 
intentional and some is not, but regards this as no problem for 
this analysis. But his analysis and his definition of selection at 
the same time appear to minimise the significance of the rational 
element in scientific reasoning and endeavour, as if selection 
within science (and more generally within culture) did not 
involve the adoption of one rather than another hypothesis for 
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reasons, unlike selection in the sense of ‘natural selection’. Hull 
later refers passingly to ‘rational selection’, but concludes that 
‘the effects of intentionality’ make comparatively little 
difference. (26) 
 
This view of science has been criticised by Michael Ruse. In 
particular, Hull’s treatment of science, according to Ruse, ‘fails 
to account for’ the ‘sense of progress that we have … about 
science’. … ‘It makes good sense to say that Mendel was ahead 
of his predecessors, just as Watson and Crick were ahead of 
their predecessors. Yet … our biological evolution is not 
progressive’ (27). So scientific change and evolutionary change 
may be radically different, although Ruse here declares himself 
convinced neither by those who assert actual progress in science 
nor by those who deny it (28). 
 
Hull may well be right, or largely right, about the characteristic 
motivations of scientists, and also about the important social 
aspects of scientific development. But it does not follow that 
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scientists (either in the role of researchers or in that of peer-
reviewers) cannot and do not exercise rational discrimination in 
appraising new theories, and do not sometimes produce better 
hypotheses and explanations than their predecessors, and 
sometimes ones rightly recognised as such. Ruse explains how 
there are several varieties of evolutionary epistemology, and that 
not all regard the validity of new theories as relative to their 
social and intellectual context (29). Hull’s approach, by contrast, 
appears to make apparent progress in science relative to the 
local conditions of acceptability, just as he considers apparent 
advances in natural evolution to be relative to the spatial and 
temporal niches of the participants. 
 
Hull’s account of science as a process is characterised by his 
understanding of scientific ideas as memes, units between which 
selection can take place comparable to the biological units of 
genes, which are central to the process of natural selection. (30) 
But this way of treating ideas as if they operated through causal 
powers analogous to those of genes confers on their selection 
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and reception a deterministic character that further elides the 
rational role of individual scientists. Thus interpreted, science is 
less likely to appear capable of rational advances, given the 
apparent beguilement of scientific researchers by the power of 
memes to infiltrate their way into scientific brains. But if 
scientific ideas are regarded not as memes but as rational 
activity, purposefully and actively shared, sifted, amended and 
tested, a different picture emerges which is less hostile to 
genuine scientific progress being made, progress not needing to 
be regarded as invariably relative to the local situation, and 
capable of being regarded as better reflecting the nature of the 
phenomena studied. (I have discussed memes in greater detail 
elsewhere (31). 
 
For his part, Ruse, despite finding much to endorse in Hull’s 
account, emphasises a key disanalogy between conceptual 
change in science and evolutionary change in nature. As he puts 
it, ‘new elements of science seem in some sense to be directed 
or teleological, whereas the whole point about the new elements 
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of the organic world is that they are not so directed or 
teleological’ (32). Thus the very purposiveness and non-
randomness of Eldredge and Gould’s punctuated equilibrium 
theory meant that there was not the same need for natural 
selection to work on it as there is when random variants appear 
in the realm of natural selection (33). For the actual aim is to 
produce a theory closer to the truth.  
 
Here it would be appropriate to comment that Ruse’s disanalogy 
turns not only on the intentionality of scientists (a point that 
Hull recognises and is untroubled by) but on their ingenuity and 
rationality. This is what makes scientific debates different from 
evolutionary struggles and competition, as the rational 
advantages of new proposals are related to and integrated with 
existing and newly discovered data and theories. Yet Ruse 
writes as if his disanalogy turned mainly on intentionality, as he 
now quotes an extensive passage of Hull on this topic, and (to 
his surprise) finds that he agrees with it. What is really more 
surprising is this: Hull accepts at one stage in this passage that 
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‘Conceptual evolution, especially in science, is both locally and 
globally progressive’, and attributes this fact to the intentionality 
of scientists (34). As we have seen, however, this feature of 
science is due to more than intentionality, and its recognition 
appears to involve a major concession from Hull, as a social 
relativist, to his more progressivist opponents and critics. 
 
Opponents of progressivism in science might here appeal to the 
sceptical arguments of Larry Laudan, who argues impressively 
against several kinds and varieties of realism and progressivism 
about science. Laudan, however, does not deny the possibility of 
scientific progress, but actually supplies criteria for recognising 
it. Thus ‘If TN has more confirmed consequences (and greater 
conceptual simplicity) than TO, then TN is preferable to TO …’ 
even if TN cannot explain the explanatory success of TO and does 
not incorporate its component theories’ (35). While this is not 
the only possible characterisation of progress, it suffices to 
demonstrate the possibility of a succession of such advances, 
while also showing that not all new theories incorporate 
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whatever items made their predecessors appear successful. 
Progressivists need not claim that every new theory is superior 
to previous theories in the same field, but assert that some are, 
and that there can be a sequence of such advances across time. 
Nor must progressivists invariably be realists (although they 
may be more consistent if such they are (36)); for 
instrumentalists (for example) could also credit sequences of 
advances, all satisfying Laudan’s characterisation, and thus 
adhere to progressivism. Indeed the debates about progressivism 
and about realism to some degree concern independent issues. 
 
Parallel debates to those concerning Hull’s relativist view of 
science could readily be conducted on whether there is progress 
in historiography, or in other humanities disciplines such as 
literary criticism or philosophy. Followers of Hull could easily 
apply their kind of evolutionary epistemology to these 
disciplines, and employ the models of selection, of fitness to 
survive, and of a competition between memes to their debates. 
Yet a parallel reply could be made, that in these connections too 
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it makes sense to talk of progress being made, whether in 
understanding the past, in interpreting literature, or in appraising 
philosophical theories and concepts. Here too the debates cannot 
be understood as a contest between memes to colonise 
populations of researchers, as opposed to the active 
discrimination of research communities in sifting the wheat 
from the chaff of explanatory theories and interpretations. And 
here too, it is the rationality of the participants that an 
evolutionary epistemologist of Hull’s variety would find it 
hardest to accommodate. While evidence of actual progress in 
these fields may be rare and elusive, the rational nature of these 
undertakings seems in the end to make it possible for such 
progress to be made, as is also the case in science. An example 
of such progress can be found in the discovery by Milman Parry 
and Alfred Lord of the oral transmission of the Homeric poems 
over many centuries by a whole succession of minstrels (37). 
 
Thus the possibility of cultural progress based on reasoning 
cannot be restricted to the natural sciences. Consider Popper’s 
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own work (already mentioned above) on the philosopher 
Xenophanes, the philosopher who declared that the gods did not 
reveal everything to humanity from the start, allowing them 
space to get to understand things better. Popper contrived to 
vindicate Xenophanes against calumnies (both ancient and 
modern) which represented him as holding the ridiculous view 
that the earth is infinite, explaining this misinterpretation as a 
mistaken construction of one of the surviving fragments, which 
has a clear and sensible but different meaning (38). This 
argument of Popper in the realm of the history of philosophy 
can reasonably be held to amount to progress itself, the very 
possibility that Xenophanes had declared the gods to facilitate 
(39). Now Popper also argued that Xenophanes was the earliest 
adherent of the method of conjectures and refutations (40), 
which he has shown to be a fruitful method in the course of the 
later history of science (e.g. in the work of Johannes Kepler) 
(41). I have argued in reply that Xenophanes need not be 
understood in this way, since he seems to have also supported 
rival methods such as induction to an equal degree (42). But this 
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is consistent with the possibility that Xenophanes’ adherence to 
the possibility of progress constituted progress itself, and that 
Popper’s vindication of Xenophanes supplies a further example 
of progress, that is, in the history of ideas and in philosophy. 
 
To revert now to the topic of progress in science, although Ruse 
is much less unsympathetic to there being progress in science 
than Hull, it is open to question whether his own version of 
evolutionary epistemology is fully consistent with belief in 
actual progress. His own version emphasises what he calls 
‘epigenetic rules’ for all intellectual disciplines (43), 
fundamental rules such as the law of non-contradiction and ‘2 + 
2 = 4’ (which supposedly take the form in human beings of 
innate dispositions), and maintains that their necessary truth is 
somehow grounded in their survival advantage. If they had 
lacked this advantage, it is held, then they would neither have 
been necessary truths, nor would have been believed as widely 
as they are by human beings. For their credibility is due to 
human evolution, rather than to factors that would have to be 
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recognised by any intelligent species, whatever its own 
evolutionary origins.  
 
But this approach seems to cast into question whether the 
discoveries that are based on these rules can be held to represent 
progress, in view of the chance nature of their status and 
(supposed) origins. For the key criterion of acceptability within 
the various disciplines that embody or depend on these rules 
(logic and mathematics included) appears to be not truth but 
fitness for survival; hence such discoveries could make their 
holders fitter to survive without any advance towards the truth. 
(This is a version of a criticism that Ruse himself directs from 
time to time at Hull, but nevertheless it appears applicable to 
evolutionary epistemology not only of Hull’s kind but of other 
kinds as well.) While there may be innate dispositions in human 
beings, the status of the fundamental principles of logic and 
mathematics can hardly turn on this kind of innateness. More 
generally, this kind of evolutionary epistemology appears (for 
the same reasons) barely compatible with belief in objective 
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scientific progress, and may help account for Ruse’s reluctance 
to endorse absolute scientific progress as opposed to scientific 
progress of a context-relative kind. 
 
If, however, we are prepared to credit the possibility (and 
sometimes the reality) of scientific advances (as Ruse seems 
inclined to do with regard to the work of Darwin and of 
Mendel), then the possibility of progress in the humanities, 
including the history of philosophy and even philosophy itself 
receives enhanced support. Why should not practitioners of 
humanities disciplines make advances in understanding culture, 
the arts, the past, or significant concepts, possibly through using 
improved techniques (as well as improved technology), or 
through taking into account the need for consistency between 
the answers to an increased range of questions? Even if there are 
gaps in the progress of a discipline for whole generations 





Needless to say, if progress is possible in philosophy and in the 
history of philosophy, it is also possible within the study of 
history and, by the same token, in social studies and in political 
science too. Both the humanities and the social sciences, like the 
natural sciences, embody the capacity for artificial selection, 
indeed for purposive selection, as opposed to natural selection 
(to which in Darwin’s understanding they supplied the contrast 
that he needed to allow talk of ‘natural selection’ to make 
sense). In other words, human culture continues to have room 
for progress. And some progress involves directionality, or 
movement towards recognisable or agreed destinations. In the 
case of the humanities, the social sciences and the natural 
sciences, the agreed goal is improved understanding of the 
phenomena studied. 
 
Nor, perhaps, can the possibility of social progress be excluded, 
although the criteria would be different ones. Ruse considers 
that few signs of progress are apparent in current society, but 
grants that there may have been ‘times and places when 
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(absolute) societal progress seemed obvious’ (45). The criteria 
of this past progress are not specified, but if what he has in mind 
includes the nineteenth-century abolition of slavery in Europe 
and America, then the criteria would relate to increased justice 
and liberty. Biologists diverge in their attitudes to social 
progress, with George Williams a pessimist (46) and E.O. 
Wilson an optimist (47); in each case a parallel view is adopted, 
whether pessimistic or optimistic, of progress in organic nature 
and in society as well. Wilson in particular believes that ‘the 
same sociobiological forces govern the forward movement of 
society as have governed the upward rise of organisms’ (48). 
Ruse considers that evolutionists with views such as these see 
progress in their science and proceed to read progress into both 
society and into organic nature. (49) Yet, through recognising 
past episodes of progress in society, he admits himself that such 
progress can and does happen. As for progress in organic nature, 
that is the topic of the coming section. 
 
5. BACK TO EVOLUTION 
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So progress and, to some extent, directionality are genuine 
possibilities within culture, and in particular in the humanities 
and the sciences, and are acknowledged to characterise some 
tracts of history, even by sceptics. Let us now return to 
evolution, to consider whether the realm of natural selection is 
entirely different (as Ruse believes (50)), or whether, as some 
biologists believe, comparable. 
 
Evidence for the possibility of progress and directionality in 
evolution could possibly be found in the evolutionary 
emergence of increasingly sophisticated organisms with 
increasingly sophisticated capacities.  I have in mind not only 
human beings and their capacities for understanding and insight, 
but also organisms such as whales and dolphins, with their 
capacities for communication and collaboration. If there is 
intrinsic value in the development of the generic capacities of 
organisms, it may be possible to recognise greater and richer 
forms of intrinsic value in the emergence of capacities such as 
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these, and in the development of such capacities within the lives 
of individuals of the species concerned. 
 
I am not suggesting that such developments are evidence for 
some form of unilinear directionality, with non-human 
organisms somewhere along a continuum and the capacities of 
human beings at its apex. Charles Darwin was firmly opposed to 
such a view, and for this reason avoided where possible even 
using the term ‘evolution’, to avoid being misunderstood as 
supportive of unilinear progressive development (51). Indeed 
natural selection can be seen as favouring adaptation to 
particular circumstances and ecological niches, as opposed to 
generic improvement. Nevertheless Darwin appears to have 
believed in progressive tendencies within evolutionary 
processes: thus in the third edition of the Origin he wrote as 
follows: 
 
If we look at the differentiation and specialisation of the 
several organs of each being when adult (and this will include 
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the brain for intellectual purposes) as the best standard of 
highness of organisation, natural selection clearly leads 
towards highness; for all physiologists admit that the 
specialisation of organs, inasmuch as they perform in this 
state their functions better, is an advantage to each being; and 
hence the accumulation of variations tending towards 
specialisation is within the scope of natural selection (52). 
 
Such an accumulation of adaptive variations, including the 
development of brains, comprised genuine progress, in Darwin’s 
view. 
 
Thus what we find is increasing sophistication, albeit in multiple 
directions. Simpler eyes evolve into more complex ones, 
supportive of more sophisticated kinds of evolutionary fitness. 
Correspondingly, the environment of the oceans supports forms 
of emergent sophistication such as those of whales and of 
dolphins, which are much better suited to survival, let alone 
flourishing in the oceans, than human beings are, or at least 
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were prior to their invention of ships. The environments of 
rivers, forests and mountains promote yet other diverse forms of 
sophistication. The sophistication of some human capacities 
seems well-adapted to savannahs, but it is only technology that 
has made other environments humanly habitable. 
 
An appropriate way of regarding this pattern of diverse 
specialisation and sophistication is not a ladder or escalator, but 
the Darwinian model, cited with approval by Mary Midgley, of 
evolution seen as a bush with radiating branches (53). The 
branches radiate in different directions, some of which develop 
their own forms of culture, taught by one generation to another, 
such as the use of tools among monkeys, and collaborative 
hunting by whales. But cultural achievements arguably have an 
intrinsic value of their own, in addition to their value in terms of 
the survival of communities and of species. Organisms with 
culture make worlds of their own, and it is difficult not to 
recognise some form of directionality in their doing so, or at 
least in the achievements involved, such as successful 
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communication, even when the kind of directionality appears 
entirely different from that of the directionality that we may be 
prepared to recognise within human culture, for example in the 
sciences and the humanities. 
 
Admittedly the kinds of directionality here do not involve 
progress towards goals agreed antecedently. On the other hand 
we can recognise directionality towards implicit goals such as 
survival, enhanced ways of coping with a given environment, 
and adaptability to a wider range of environments. Development 
towards these implicit goals is readily recognisable among 
species and organisms. So talk about progressive development 
in nature is not entirely inappropriate. 
 
This interpretation is in line with that of Rolston, cited above. 
Rolston also discusses speciation as embodying a kind of 
progress in fecundity, with life on earth developing across three 
and a half billion years from a world of zero species to one 
containing as many as between five and ten millions (54). The 
37 
phenomenon of speciation and its history makes Darwin’s 
model of a radiating bush (with its hint of multiple 
directionality) all the more appropriate. Those who uphold 
directionality in nature certainly need to be cautious of 
inadvertently promoting Social Darwinism, eugenics or racist 
ideologies. But upholding belief in multiple directionality, 
represented by the biodiversity of between five and ten million 
species, is hardly open to problems of any of these kinds. 
 
The current interpretation can also be regarded as in line with 
the findings of the biologist Simon Conway Morris, who has 
written of life’s convergence, in the course of evolution, on a 
relatively small number of recurrent successful patterns, 
chlorophyll, sentience and intelligence included, which Morris 
argues would evolve again if the tape of evolutionary history 
were to be re-run (55). Morris’s conclusions are controversial, 
but his evidence of ‘the ubiquity of convergence’ is impressive, 
suggesting life’s uncanny ability to find and develop a small 
range of solutions to the problems of often unpromising and 
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hostile environments (56). Indeed his own view is that these and 
other facts of evolution are congruent with the world being ‘a 
Creation’ (57). 
 
Nevertheless, the kind of directionality intended here is barely 
comparable with the kinds discussed above in the sciences and 
the humanities, and thus hardly in line with the comparisons 
between nature and the sciences in point of progress drawn by 
E.O. Wilson and others. Yet both in nature and in culture these 
different kinds of directionality are readily interpreted as 
embodying and as generating states of affairs of positive value. 
Some reflections on this state of affairs are offered in the section 
that follows. 
 
6. THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
How we are to interpret these diverse kinds of directionality 
depends on intuitions, sometimes informed by separate 
experiences or patterns of reasoning. Readers interested in the 
interface of science, society and religion may be prepared to 
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consider the relation of these diverse kinds of directionality to 
the theistic hypothesis of there being a creator who creates in a 
manner supportive of intrinsic value, and possibly welcomes 
and facilitates value of this kind, that is value that there is reason 
for any agent to welcome, cherish, desire or promote. 
 
Certainly the facts of evolution do not require us to adopt this 
hypothesis, let alone those of human history. Nor do the kinds of 
directionality that we find in the sciences and the humanities. 
The facts of evolution, for example, are consistent with non-
theistic interpretations such as unqualified materialism, even 
though it does not explain these facts, as opposed to telling us 
not to seek an explanation beyond nature. 
 
However, there is quite a good fit between the kinds of possible 
directionality that we have come across and this hypothesis. For 
a creator desirous of a world of intrinsic value could well be 
responsible for both the worlds of nature and of culture, of 
evolution and of history. At least some of the phenomena are 
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what might be expected if this hypothesis were true, such as the 
emergence of creativity both in animal and in human cultures. 
 
But there are problems. One of these is the extent of pain, 
suffering and premature death, states which are not states of 
value but of disvalue. Holmes Rolston has well discussed 
‘Disvalues in Nature’ from a theistic perspective (58), but there 
is no space to delve into this matter here. Nor can I discuss here 
the parallel problem of disvalues in culture and in human 
history. 
 
Another problem is the belated appearance of many forms of 
intrinsic value. Some might expect that a creator desirous of 
intrinsic value would bring it onto the stage sooner, if not from 
the outset. I will conclude with some remarks about this 
apparent problem, and then with discussion of a proposal about 
how progress in evolution might possibly be explained. 
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The problem of belatedness is a corollary of recognition of 
directionality, since directionality would not be needed if arrival 
at its destination or destinations had been put in place and 
realised earlier or all along. But the directionality of culture, 
including the arts and the sciences, can perhaps be reconciled 
with a theological interpretation along the lines implicitly put 
forward by Xenophanes. The gods, he suggests, did not disclose 
everything originally, so that human beings could gradually 
discover what was better (59), no doubt through exercising their 
curiosity, their cognitive capacities and their world-building 
potentials. What is attained in these ways, it could be argued, is 
more valuable than a world of much ampler knowledge and 
understanding arising from plenary briefings to humanity from 
the gods or other creative powers, for these are attainments 
resulting from the exercise of creaturely powers of reflection 
and evaluation of alternative solutions, and such exercise has 
value in itself. If so, the directionality of culture is just what 




To some slight extent, the same applies to the course of human 
history, as the history of the arts and the sciences are an 
important component of this history. We should, I suggest, with 
Popper, reject laws of progress, but that does not commit us to 
rejecting all traces of historical progress. However, the record is 
extremely patchy and diverse, and cannot here be further 
appraised. 
 
For it remains to consider the related problem about 
directionality relevant to evolution, and to the ‘Darwinian bush’ 
kind of multiple directionality apparent there. Would not a 
creator desirous of intrinsic value introduce a swifter process 
than that of evolution, if the goal was the manifestation of the 
various kinds of directionality and of the achievements that 
sometimes accompany them (the flowering of the bush, as it 
might be said (so as to preserve the metaphor)? But here a 
parallel reply becomes at least a possibility. Perhaps the creator 
wanted the achievements of dolphins, whales, gorillas and 
human beings to come about as a result of the trial and error 
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processes characteristic of evolution. Popper himself regarded 
these processes as primitive counterparts of the conscious 
procedures of science itself; and, despite their dissimilarities 
(much remarked by Ruse) their characteristic of proceeding by 
trial and error can be seen as a common characteristic.  
 
But we do not need to go all the way with Popper in this matter 
to take seriously the thoughts that the creative exertions of 
earlier creatures made possible those of later and more 
sophisticated ones, and that, rather than organisms being created 
with these capacities already in place and honed for practices 
like science, it could have appeared better that such capacities 
should themselves evolve over long tracts of time. That way, the 
process of evolution contrived to support greater biodiversity 
and possibly, all ages considered, as much value, if not greater. 
 
Before we turn to conclusions, it is worth considering the recent 
suggestion of Robert John Russell about the way in which God 
may guide the course of evolution. Granted that evolution 
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depends both on natural selection and on genetic mutations 
between which this selection is made, the core of Russell’s 
suggestion is that God may guide evolution through actions 
affecting such mutations (60). Expressed like this, his proposal 
may appear to involve intervention with the operation of laws of 
nature, or even to involve ‘a God of the gaps’. So, whether or 
not we endorse Russell’s stance, it is important to explain that, 
at least overtly, these are mistaken appearances. 
 
As a believer in creation, Russell accepts that God, as creator, is 
responsible for the laws of nature, and maintains them without 
intervening in their operation. But at the same time the created 
universe is so constructed that God can act without ‘intervening 
in the flow of natural processes’ (61). One of the levels of such 
action is that of quantum mechanics, which is integrally 
involved in genetic mutations (62), and reflects ontological 
indeterminism in nature (63), given a realist interpretation of the 
Heisenberg/Schrödinger Indeterminacy Principle. Divine action 
at this level does not involve generating ‘gaps’ as sites for 
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changing the causal sequence of events, but was embodied in 
the overall plan of creation, while remaining invisible except to 
the eye of faith. Providential action, mediated through quantum 
processes (64), can make a difference to mutations, such as 
those related to the molecular bonds of DNA (65), and thus 
affect the phenotypic expression of such mutations (66). 
Accordingly Russell’s proposal, for non-interventional but 
objective divine action, avoids at least the more obvious kinds 
of objections liable to be directed at it, and at the same time 
serves to show one way in which God may possibly guide or 
steer evolution, thus potentially underpinning directionality, 
whether in the direction of diversity, of consciousness, or of 
both. 
 
Russell’s ingenious proposal could thus be seen as lending 
support to belief in divine purposes being progressively fulfilled 
in the course of evolution. However, it would not explain the 
‘step us, lock up’ phenomenon remarked by Rolston, since that 
involves the continuing survival of initially selected mutations, 
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and not their generation. Further, Russell’s commitment to a 
plurality of acts of special providence spread out across the 
history of life (67) continues to be reminiscent of a ‘God of the 
gaps’ approach, not least because each of them is held to change 
the antecedent course of evolutionary history, although this 
problem might perhaps be averted if this divine action were 
instead regarded as an aspect of the general providence implicit 
in creation itself. In any case, adherents of belief in the out-
working of divine purposes across evolution have no need to 
appeal to this possibility, but could, as Morris does, appeal 
instead to aspects of the overall creative plan, such as the limited 
range of solutions to life-problems and the ability of evolving 
life to converge upon them. Belief in providence, then, need not 
turn on acceptance of Russell’s proposal. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Ruse concluded that there is a much stronger case for belief in 
progress (albeit relative progress) in science than in history and 
society, and that the case for progress in organic nature was 
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slender in the extreme, since adaptation turns on genetic 
mutations, which are random and lack intentionality (68). At the 
same time, he was more convinced that within science there are 
attempts to move closer to the truth (because of the 
intentionality of scientists) than that non-relative or absolute 
progress is made (69). He also rejected the views of biologists 
who have accepted progress in science and in nature too on the 
basis that the same sociobiological processes are present in both 
realms (70), stressing again that the intentionality of science 
(and generally of culture) marks it off from the natural realm. At 
times, though, he represented these findings from his 
comparisons as largely matters of taste (71). 
 
In this essay I have adopted a more robust view of (non-relative) 
progress in science and the humanities, grounded not only in the 
intentionality of the participants, but also in their rationality and 
rational collaboration; and this is an interpretation that co-
incides with widespread contemporary intuitions. Such progress 
is neither inevitable nor necessarily continuous, but accepting it 
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is more than a matter of taste, for these are realms where 
progress (involving a better understanding of relevant 
phenomena) is widely recognised as a matter of fact. I have 
found myself in agreement with Ruse that the grounds for belief 
in progress in the distinct realms of science, society and nature 
are different, and that radical forms of evolutionary 
epistemology that assimilate selection in science to selection in 
nature are to be rejected. But I have also raised questions about 
Ruse’s own more moderate version of evolutionary 
epistemology, for other reasons. 
 
Yet I have concluded that progress is achievable and 
directionality is observable within both the sciences and the 
humanities, and that they sometimes figure, albeit with a less 
predictable frequency, within history and society. With regard to 
organic nature, my conclusions are, following Rolston, that the 
history of speciation has brought salutary advances in point of 
biodiversity, and that the growth of variety, complexity and 
sophistication among organisms (for which Darwin’s radiating 
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tree is an appropriate model) embodies multiple directionality, 
even though such evolutionary progress takes place as a result of 
unintended mutations and adaptations. Nature does not display 
the kind of directionality that science does, because of the lack 
of intentionality on the part of most of the organisms involved; 
but unintentional yet valuable directionality and progress can 
still be discerned. 
 
I have also argued that there is a consilience between the 
emergence of value in nature, science and society as thus 
understood, and their creation by a value-loving creator. These 
theological intuitions do not follow from the nature of organic 
nature, science or society; but they can still illuminate what we 
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